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SOME CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
ON STATE SALES TAXES
By LAURENCE 1\1. JONES*
I. INTRODUCTION
A LTHOUGH there has in the past been agitation for sales taxes
and though such taxes had to a limited extent been adopted,
it was not until the past few years that they became of any con-
siderable importance as part of the American fiscal system. The
need for additional revenue, the clamor for the reduction of taxes
on real estate, and the inability of a net income tax, in these times,
to supply the necessary money, have caused the states to turn to
the sales tax as a way out of their difficulties. The introduction
of a new method of taxation, of course, presents many legal prob-
lems.' This article, however, is limited to a discussion of the
problems raised by those clauses of the federal constitution pro-
hibiting state taxation of imports and exports2 and relating to
interstate commerce.3
II. IMPORTS AND EXPORTS CLAUSE
The constitution of the United States provides that:
"No state shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any
imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be
absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws."'
The word imports as used in this prohibition refers only to
*Assistant Professor of Law, Lamar School of Law, Emory Univer-
sity, Ga.
'A recent case, Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, (1935) -94 U. S.
550, 55 Sup. Ct. 525, 79 L. Ed. 1054, held a graduated gross sales tax
unconstitutional as a violation of the fourteenth amendment, irrespective
of whether the tax applied to imports or exports, or interstate or intrastate
commerce.
2United States constitution, art. I, sec. 10.
3United States constitution, art. I, sec. 8.4 United States constitution, art. I, sec. 10.
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goods coming into a state from foreign countries and not to goods
coming from sister states.5 Likewise the word exports refers only
to goods going to foreign countries.6 In determining how far
this provision prevents the application of a sales tax to the sale
or business of selling imports and exports the writer has arranged
the cases in the following order. First are cases dealing with taxes
on the sale or business of selling imported goods in the original
packages in which they are imported. Then come the cases of
taxes on sales of imported goods made after the original packages
have been broken. These are followed by the cases on the taxing
of sales of exports.
A tax on the sale or occupation of selling imports while they
still remained in the possession of the importer in the original
package was held invalid in Brown v. Maryland.' Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall, in refuting the argument that the tax was not
on the article imported, but on the sale or occupation of selling
it and therefore not within the terms of the constitution, said:
"It is impossible to conceal from ourselves that this is varying
the form, without varying the substance. It is treating a prohibi-
tion which is general, as if it were confined to a particular nlode
of doing the forbidden thing. All must perceive that a tax oil
the sale of an-article, imported only for sale, is a tax on the article
itself. . . . So, a tax on the occupation of an importer is, in like
manner, a tax on the importation."'
The case was approved and followed in Cook v. Pennsylvania9
which held unconstitutional a tax on auction sales as applied to
the sale of goods which had been imported and which the
auctioneer had sold for the importers in the original packages.
In both these cases the tax in question was discriminatory, the
effect behng to place imports at a disadvantage as compared to
local products. The court, however, did not place its decision on
the grounds of discrimination, but laid down the general rule that
no tax could apply to sales, by the importer, of imports while they
remained in the original package in which they were imported.
In Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v. Alabamal0 the
Alabama corporate franchise tax was held inapplicable to a cor-
5 Woodruff v. Parham, (1869) 8 Wall. (U.S.) 123, 19 L. Ed. 382;
Brown v. Houston, (1885) 114 U. S. 622, 5 Sup. Ct. 1091, 29 L. Ed. 257.
GDooley v. United States, (1901) 183 U. S. 151, 22 Sup. Ct. 62, 46 L.
Ed. 128.
7(1827) 12 Wheat. (U.S.) 419, 6 L. Ed. 678
8(1827) 12 Wheat. (U.S.) 419, 444, 6 L. Ed. 678.
9(1878) 97 U. S. 566, 24 L. Ed. 1015.1"(1933) 288 U. S. 218, 53 Sup. Ct. 373, 77 L. Ed. 710.
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poration engaged exclusively in importing nitrate and selling it
within the state in the original packages in which it was imported.
The tax was based on the amount of capital employed in the
state and was interpreted by the state court to be on the actual
doing of business within the state rather than on the authorization
or privilege of doing business. The corporation employed no
capital in Alabama other than that represented by the nitrate
imports, and, though having qualified to do so, did not engage in
business other than the selling of the imports in the original pack-
ages. Mr. Justice Butler, for the majority, declared:
"The right to import the nitrate included the right to sell it in
the original bags while it remained the property of the appellant
and before it lost its distinctive character as an import. . . .Ala-
bama was powerless, without the consent of Congress. to tax the
nitrate before such sales or to require appellant by the payment
of occupation or franchise tax or otherwise to purchase from it
the privilege of selling goods so imported and handled."' 1
Mr. Justice Cardozo, for the minority, insisted that, since "the
appellant was not satisfied to stand upon its federal right" and had
"asked for and obtained a license or franchise ... to do a local
business as well as one related to interstate or foreign commerce,"
the state of Alabama was competent to tax the privilege granted.
The interpretation of the state court, in the opinion of the majority,
had precluded upholding the tax on such grounds.
The case on its facts is much like Ficklen v. Shelby Counly
Taxing District"2 which sustained a tax measured by gross re-
ceipts, even though the business transacted was entirely interstate
commerce, on the ground that the defendant had taken out a
license to do a general business. Neither Mr. Justice Butler, for
the majority, nor Mr. Justice Cardozo, for the minority, mentioned
the Ficklen Case. This is somewhat surprising, although the
Ficklen Case has been consistently distinguished by the court in
later cases. The Crew Levick" Case had previously undermined
most of the grounds of the Ficklen Case, leaving only the pos-
sibility that the tax in the Ficklen Case might be sustained as an
occupation tax. The reasoning in the Nitrate Case is opposed to
such a solution, thus apparently removing the possibility of meas-
uring a tax on doing local business or the privilege of doing such
business by a percentage of the gross receipts from all business.
11(1933) 288 U. S. 218, 225-26, 53 Sup. Ct. 373, 77 L. Ed. 710.
12(1892) 145 U. S. 1, 32 Sup. Ct 810, 36 L. Ed. 601.
:'(1917) 245 U. S. 292, 38 Sup. Ct. 126, 62 L. Ed. 295.
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Where the sales of the imports are not by the importer him-
self but by subsequent purchasers from him, they are taxable even
though the goods still remain in the original packages. Thus a
tax on merchants and traders measured by a percentage of their
gross sales was upheld where the sales were of imports purchased
by the seller from the importers and later sold by him. 1 4 The
court pointed out the limit of the exemption as follows:
"Importers selling the imported articles in the original pack-
ages are shielded from any such state tax but the privilege of
exemption is not extended to the purchaser, as the merchandise by
the sale and delivery, loses its distinctive character as an import."'1
Once the original package in which the goods were imported
into this country has been broken, sales of the contents may be
taxed. The limits of the doctrine that the first sale of the original
package is exempt were indicated by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall
in Brown v. Maryland when he said:
"when the importer has so acted upon the thing imported
that it has become incorporated and mixed up with the mass of
property in the country, it has, perhaps, lost its distinctive char-
acter as an import, and has become subject to the taxing power
of the state; but while remaining the property of the importer, in
his warehouse, in the original form or package in which it was
imported, a tax upon it is too plainly a duty on imports to escape
the prohibition in the constitution.""
The importer "has so acted upon the thing imported" that it loses
its immunity from taxation when he breaks the original pack-
age and sells a part of the contents.t1 The goods being once in-
corporated into the general mass of property in the state by the
breaking of the original package, the sales of the contents are tax-
able whether made by the importer himself or by others.
Sales of exports made directly to foreign buyers may not be
taxed under a general mercantile license tax, measured by a per-
centage of the gross sales, levied on all dealers irrespective of the
kind of business in which they are engaged.' The merchants
in question were engaged in both local and foreign commerce,
and the state attempted to exact a license tax measured by the
receipts from both sources. This was not allowed, the court
declaring:
I'W aring v. Mobile. (1869) 8 Wall. (U.S.) 110. 19 L. Fd. 342.
15(1869) 8 Wall. (U.S.) 110, 123, 19 L. Ed. 342.
1'(1827) 12 Wheat. (U.S.) 419. 441-42. 6 L. Ed. 678.
1\WVaring v. Mobile, (1869) 8 Wall. (U.S.) 110, 19 L. Ed. 342.
lsCrew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, (1917) 245 U. S. 292, 38 Sup. ( t
126, 62 L. Ed. 295.
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"the . . . imposition of a percentage upon each dollar of
the gross transactions in foreign commerce seems to us to be, by
its necessary effect, a tax upon such commerce, and therefore a
regulation of it; and for the same reason, to be in effect an impost
or duty upon exports."' 9
The seller made no objection to the validity of the small fixed tax
imposed on all vendors, but did object to "that portion of the tax
which is measured by the receipts from foreign commerce." Such
a tax varies directly with the volume of commerce and operates to
lay a direct burden on it. The state relied largely on the Ficklen"
Case, but the court distinguished it. The distinctions, however,
were formal rather than substantive, and the. reasoning of Mr.
Justice Pitney's opinion is opposed to the use of the gross receipts
from exempt sales as the measure of a privilege tax. In view of
the reasoning in the Nitrate"- Case it seems probable that such
a tax will not be allowed.
Neither may sales for exportation made through commission
merchants be taxed, even though the merchant technically acquires
title to the goods before shipment. In Spalding & Bros. v. Ed-
wards" the goods were bought by a comnission merchant on an
export order for a foreign purchaser, the manufacturer delivering
the goods direct to the exporting carrier. The transfer of the title
through the commission merchant to the foreign buyer was merely
a step in the sale to the latter. The fact that the commission
merchant theoretically acquired ti'tle to the goods and could have
retained them for his own use was not regarded as controlling.
"Theoretical possibilities," said Mr. Justice Holmes, "may be left
out of account." 3 Although the case dealt with a federal tax
under the War Revenue Act, it indicates the extent of the consti-
tutional immunity from state taxation because of the similarity
of the constitutional prohibitions against federal and state taxation
of exports.
2
From this review of the cases one may conclude that any
attempt to apply a sales tax to sales, by the importer, of imports
remaining in the original package would be unconstitutional. All
subsequent sales, however, and all sales of the contents of broken
packages may be taxed; the imports in such instances having
19(1917) 245 U. S. 292, 295-296, 38 Sup. Ct. 126, 62 L. Ed. 295.20(1892) 145 U. S. 1, 12 Sup. Ct. 810. 36 L. Ed. 601.
21(1933) 288 U. S. 218, 53 Sup. Ct. 373, 77 L. Ed. 710.
2"(1923) 262 If. S. 66, 43 Sup. Ct. 485, 67 L. Ed. 865.
23(1923) 262 U. S. 66, 70, 43 Sup. Ct. 485, 67 L. Ed. 865.
24United States constitution, art I, sec. 9 and 10.
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become incorporated into the general mass of property within the
state, the immunity from taxation is lost. Any sales for export,
whether made directly to the foreign buyer or to commission mer-
chants in the course of exportation to foreign purchasers, must
also be exempt from the operation of a sales tax. Nor may a
tax be levied on the privilege of engaging in any of these exempt
transactions. But where the business consists both of exempt
and non-exempt transactions, a tax may be levied- on the non-
exempt sales. However, any attempt to measure an occupation
or privilege tax on such a business by the total sales would appar-
ently no longer be countenanced.
III. COMMi, ERCE CLAUSE
Unlike the prohibition against state taxation of imports and
exports, the so-called commerce clause of the federal constitution
does not expressly forbid state taxation of interstate commerce.
It merely provides that Congress shall have the power "To regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states,
and with the Indian tribes." 25  This is interpreted as giving Con-
gress the exclusive power to regulate those subjects of commerce
that are national in their character, and the interchange of com-
modities between the states is held to be national in its character.
Taxation of such commerce, being a form of regulation, is thus
forbidden. By this method of reasoning, the court has granted
to interstate commerce protection from the burden of state taxa-
tion which intrastate commerce must bear. In considering the
application of this doctrine in connection with a sales tax, the
cases have been divided into two main classes: first, cases in which
the tax is imposed by the state of destination of the goods sold,
and second, cases where the tax is imposed by the state of origin
of the commodities.
1. Taxes Imposed by the State of Destination.
The cases dealing with taxes imposed by the state of destina-
tion have been grouped according to the physical location of the
goods, at the time of sale, with respect to the buyer in the state of
destination. The first group of cases deals with taxes imposed on
the sale or occupation of selling goods which at the time of the
sale are not within the state of destination. The second group of
-
5United States constitution, art. 1, sec. 8.
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cases comprises taxes imposed on the sale or occupation of selling
goods which previous to the time of sale have been brought within
the state of destination.
A. TAXES ON THE SALE OR OCCUPATION OF SELLING GOODS
WHICH AT THE TIME OF SALE ARE OUTSIDE THE STATE OF DES-
TINATION.-Where the buyer in the state of destination purchases
goods which at the time of sale are in another state, and the title
to which by the terms of the transaction passes directly to the
buyer, no tax may be imposed by the state of destination." The
interchange of comnodities being interstate commerce, the consti-
tution prohibits the states from taxing it. This privilege of en-
gaging in interstate commerce without being subject to the taxing
power of a state extends to the solicitation of orders for goods
which at the time are outside the state. Such solicitation is "in
numberless instances, the most feasible, if not the only practicable,
way for the merchant or manufacturer to obtain orders in other
states;" it is an indispensable part of interstate commerce and
therefore protected by the constitution. Solicitation of the sale
of out of state goods is exempt whether made by a traveling
salesman selling to local merchants, 7 by a house to house can-
vasser selling to consumers,28 or by a broker or commission mer-
chant representing numerous out of state concerns.2 9
But where the sale is made or solicited by local merchants, the
out of state goods being shipped to the merchant, who then deliv-
ers them to the purchaser, the sale may be taxed. Such a trans-
action really involves two sales, one to the merchant and another
by the merchant to the purchaser; the latter sale, being purely a
local transaction, can be taxed. Thus in Banker Brothers Co. v.
Pennsylvania30 sales of automobiles by the Pennsylvania repre-
sentative of a New York manufacturer were held taxable although
the representative kept no stock on hand but ordered each car
after securing a purchaser, the car being shipped to the representa-
tive, who paid for it and in turn delivered it to the purchaser in
2GRobbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., (1887) 120 U. S. 489, 7
Sup. Ct. 592, 30 L. Ed. 694.
-7Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, (1887) 120 U. S. 489, 7
Sup. Ct. 592. 30 L. Ed. 694.2 Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. Portland, (1925) 268 U. S. 325, 45 Sup.
Ct. 525, 69 L. Ed. 982.29Stockard v. Morgan, (1902) 185 U. S. 27, 22 Sup. Ct. 576. 46 L.
Ed. 785.30(1911) 222 U. S. 210, 32 Sup. Ct. 38, 56 L. Ed. 168.
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Pennsylvania. Mr. Justice Lamar in speaking of the relationship
of the representative to the purchaser said:
"as between Banker Brothers Company and the Pittsburgh pur-
chaser, there can be no doubt that it occupied the position of
vendor. As such it was bound by its contract to him, and under
the duty of paying to the state a tax on the sale."
3
'
The tax sustained was the Pennsylvania mercantile license tax
measured by a percentage of the gross sales.
But quaere, in the case of a merchant who makes a special
order for a purchaser, the goods going direct from the out of
state seller to the purchaser, who pays the merchant? In such a
case the merchant takes part in the credit transaction only; his
function is analogous to that of a commission merchant, which is
not taxable. In a similar case dealing with exports, the court
held the sale exempt from taxation, although the title to the goods
technically passed through the commission merchant. 2 It has been
suggested that in the case of interstate commerce where there is
no express prohibition against taxation such technicalities might
make a difference.33
B. TAXES ON THE SALE OR OCCUPATION OF SELLING GOODS
WHIcH PREVIOUS TO THE TizIE OF SALE HAVE BEEN BROUGIIT
INTO THE STATE OF DESTINATION.-The prohibition against the
taxation of interstate commerce by the states does not prevent
the taxing of sales which previous to' the time of sale have been
brought into the state and become incorporated into the general
mass of property in the state. On an analogy to the case of
imports, the breaking of the original package or the first sale of
the goods would subject them to taxation. But where the goods
are offered for sale in the original package in which they were
brought into the state, the applicability, to interstate commerce,
of the original package doctrine must be determined. When Mr.
Chief Justice Marshall laid down the rule in Brown v. Maryland,
3 4
31(1911) 222 U. S. 210, 213, 32 Sup. Ct. 38, 56 L. Ed. 168.
S2Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, (1923) 262 U. S. 66, 43 Sup. Ct. 485,
67 L. Ed. 865.3 3Powell, Contemporary Commerce Clause Controversies Over State
Taxation, (1928) 76 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 773, 777, note 13.
See also, Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania, (1935) 294 U. S. 169, 55 Sup.
Ct. 358, 79 L. Ed. 838, upholding a state tax of three cents per gallon on
"liquid fuels used or sold and delivered" within the state, as regards fuel
ordered by a distributor within the state from a company outside the state,
the fuel to be delivered direct to the purchasers within the state, the bill
of lading naming the distributor as consignor and the purchaser as consignee.
34(1827) 12 Wheat. (U.S.) 419, 6 L. Ed. 678.
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he assumed that it applied alike to foreign and interstate commerce.
His successors, however, have taken a different view. In Wood-
ruff v. Perham,35 a tax on the sale of goods brought into the state
from a sister state and there sold in the original packages was
upheld, the tax being non-discriminatory. But in later cases the
court held that goods of extra-state origin while still in the original
packages were immune from a tax on their sale," or on the
occupation of selling them. 7 In the meantime such goods had
been held subject to the general property taxes of the state of
destination,38 and a tax on itinerant vendors going about from
place to place carrying goods with them and disposing of them
by sale was upheld irrespective of the fact that the goods were of
extra-state origin and still in the original packages. 9
A later case4" indicated that in the future taxes on the sale
of goods in the original package in which they were brought into
the state would be sustained where the tax was not discriminatory.
Finally in Sonneborn Brothers v. Keeling," the court settled the
matter by holding that an occupation tax of two per cent of the
gross sales was constitutional as applied to the sales of goods
shipped into Texas and afterwards sold in the unbroken original
packages. Mr. Chief Justice Taft pointed out that the "cases
subsequent to Brown v. Maryland show that the analogy be-
tween imports and articles in original packages in interstate coni-
merce in respect of immunity from taxation fails."'2  As Mr.
Justice Sutherland put it in a late case:
35(1869) 8 Wall. (U.S.) 123, 19 L. Ed. 382.
36Foote v. Stanley, (1914) 232 U. S. 494, 34 Sup. Ct. 377, 58 L. Ed.
698; Standard Oil Co. v. Graves, (1919) 249 U. S. 389, 39 Sup. Ct. 320.
63 L. Ed. 662; Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., (1921) 256 U. S. 642, 41
Sup. Ct. 606, 65 L. Ed. 1139.37Askren v. Continental Oil Co., (1920) 252 U. S. 444, 40 Sup. Ct.
355, 64 L. Ed. 654.3SBrown v. Houston, (1885) 114 U. S. 622, 5 Sup. Ct. 1091. 29 L. Ed.
257; American Steel and Wire Co. v. Speed, (1904) 192 U. S. 500, 24 Sup.
Ct. 365, 48 L. Ed. 538.39Wagner v. Covington, (1919) 251 U. S. 95, 40 Sup. Ct. 93, 64 L. Ed.
157. The sales taxed were made by a Cincinnati, Ohio, bottling works,
which regularly sent a truck loaded with bottled drinks across the river
into Covington, Kentucky, to supply the needs of their customers. There
was no solicitation of orders prior to the introduction of the goods into
Kentucky, but there was a regular course of business and a fairly steady
assurance of sales.
40Texas Co. v. Brown, (1922) 258 U. S. 466, 42 Sup. Ct. 375, 66
L. Ed. 721.
41(1923) 262 U. S. 506, 43 Sup. Ct. 643, 67 L. Ed. 1095.
42(1923) 262 U. S. 506, 510, 43 Sup. Ct. 643, 67 L. Ed. 1095.
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"Interstate transportation having ended, the taxing power of
the state in respect of the commodity which was the subject of
such transportation, may, so far as the commerce clause of the
federal constitution is concerned, be exerted in any way which
the state's Constitution and laws permit, provided, of course, it
does not discriminate against the commodity because of its origin
in another state."43
The sale of gas or electricity of extra-state origin presents an
interesting problem in connection with the application of a state
sales tax. The business may be carried on in two ways: first,
the same company may transmit the gas or electricity from the
state of origin to the state of destination and there sell it to the
individual consumers; second, the transmitting company may, in
the state of destination, sell the gas or electricity to a local com-
pany which distributes to the consumers. In either case the lines
used for the interstate transmission and the lines used for the
local distribution will be permanently connected, the only break in
the direct transmission from the state of origin to the consumer
being the stepping down of the pressure or voltage as the case may
be. May the the sale to the local consumers be taxed? The
answer is yes. Mr. Justice Butler, after recognizing that the
transportation of gas from one state to another was interstate
commerce, continues:
"But when the gas passes from the distribution lines into the
supply mains, it necessarily is relieved of nearly all the pressure
put upon it at the stations of the producing companies, its volume
thereby is expanded to many times what it was while in the high
pressure interstate transmission lines, and it is divided into the
many thousand relatively tiny streams that enter the small service
lines connecting such mains with the pipes on the consumers'
premises. So segregated the gas in such service lines and pipes
remains in readiness or moves forward to serve as needed. The
treatment and division of the large compressed volume of gas is
like the breaking of an original package, after shipment in inter-
state commerce, in order that its contents may be treated, prepared
for sale and sold at retail. . . . It follows that the furnishing
of gas to consumers in Ohio municipalities by means of distribu-
tion plants to supply the gas suitably for the service for which it
is intended is not interstate commerce but a business of purely
local concern exclusively within the jurisdiction of the state." *44
43Hart Refineries v. Harmon. (1929) 278 U. S. 499, 501-502, 49 Sup.
Ct. 188, 73 L. Ed. 475.44East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Commission, (1931) 283 U. S. 465, 470-
471, 51 Sup. Ct. 499, 75 L. Ed. 1171. See Howard, Gas and Electricity
in Interstate Commerce, (1934) 18 MINNEsorA LAw REVIEw 611, 702.
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The tax in question was a privilege tax measured by a percentage
of the gross receipts from the sale of gas to consumers. But the
sale of gas within the state of destination to distributing com-
panies only cannot be taxed.45 The sale in such a case is so con-
nected with the interstate transportation of the gas that it consti-
tutes part of the interstate commerce and not as in the above case
a business of "purely local concern."
A tax on the occupation of selling goods which at the time
of the sale are within the state of destination is constitutional
even though the person taxed on such transactions is also engaged
in selling goods which at the time of sale are outside the state,
if the tax, by its terms or by construction by the state court, is
limited to the sales of goods within the state, or if the tax is
separable so that it can be applied only to the local commerce.
Thus in Kehrer v. Stewart4 a license tax was upheld as applied
to the agent of an out of state packing house who took orders for
meats which were later shipped from the packing house, and who
also sold meats shipped to him without previous sale or order;
the tax had been interpreted by the state court as applying only
to the sale of the meat brought into the state prior to the solicita-
tion of orders for its sale. This case was approved and followed in
Raley & Bros. v. Richardson47 which imposed a license tax on
commission merchants, the tax being construed by the state court
as applying only to sales of goods within the state at the time of
sale. Mr. Justice Sutherland agreed with the state court that, as
Raley Brothers had solicited sales of goods within the state, at
the time of solicitation they were liable for the tax irrespective
of the fact that they also solicited the sale of goods which were
outside the state at the time.
"The complainants were definitely engaged in the domestic
business described in the statute, and were liable to the tax,
irrespective of the extent of it, and whether they engaged in inter-
state business in addition or not .... Certainly one cannot avoid
a tax upon a taxable business by also engaging in a non-taxable
business." 48
In Ratterman v. Western Union Tel. Co. 49 a tax assessed upon
45State Tax. Comm'n. v. Interstate Nat. Gas Co., (1931) 284 U. S.
41, 52 Sup. Ct. 62, 76 L. Ed. 156. See Howard, Gas and Electricity in
Interstate Commerce, (1934) 18 MINNEsorA LAw REvIEw 611, 706.
46(1905) 197 U. S. 60, 25 Sup. Ct. 403, 49 L. Ed. 663.
417(1924) 264 U. S. 157, 44 Sup. Ct. 256, 68 L. Ed. 615.
-48(1924) 264 U. S. 157, 159, 44 Sup. Ct. 256, 68 L. Ed. 615.
49(1888) 127 U. S. 411, 8 Sup. Ct. 1127, 32 L. Ed. 229.
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the receipts of a telegraph company engaged in transmitting both
local and interstate messages was held invalid to the extent that it
applied to the receipts from interstate messages. The receipts
being separable, the tax was upheld as applied to the local mes-
sages.
But if the sales of goods made after the property is brought
within the state are nominal and incidental to the carrying on of
the interstate commerce, they cannot be taxed. 0 In the Kehrer
Case the court suggested that any local sales of meat made neces-
sary because of the refusal of the buyer to accept a shipment from
the out of state packer would not subject the agent to taxation.
Such sales, the court said, would be a necessary part of the ititer-
state commerce and thus exempt. A sales tax may, therefore, be
applied to sales of goods which at the time of sale are within the
state, even though the seller is also engaged in selling goods not
within the state, unless the sales are merely incidental to and a
necessary part of the latter business.
However, an attempt to measure a privilege tax on doing local
business by the gross receipts both from sales of goods within the
state and sales of goods outside the state at the time of sale
would probably be unconstitutional. An early case, Ficklen v.
Shelby County Taxing District,5' upheld a privilege tax on mier-
chandise brokers even though the tax was measured by a per-
centage of the gross commissions and all the sales negotiated
were of goods outside the state at the time of sale. Mr. Ficklen,
having taken out a license to do a general commission business,
was held amenable to the tax. The Ficklen Case relied largely
on Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. 5 2 as support for measuring
the tax by the gross receipts from interstate commerce. The
Maine Case has since been explained on other grounds by the
court,5 3 and later cases, as pointed out above,5 have tended to
discredit the Ficklen Case. This, together with the remarks of Mr.
Justice Pitney in United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek"5 in dis-
50See Kehrer v. Stewart, (1905) 197 U. S. 60, 25 Sup. Ct. 403, 49 L.
Ed. 663, and Raley & Bros. v. Richardson, (1924) 264 U. S. 157, 44 Sup.
Ct. 256, 68 L. Ed. 615.51(1892) 145 U. S. 1, 12 Sup. Ct. 810, 36 L. Ed. 601.
52(1891) 142 U. S. 217, 12 Sup. Ct. 121, 35 L. Ed. 994.
13Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Texas, (1908) 210 U. S. 217, 28
Sup. Ct. 638, 52 L. Ed. 1031.54See pp. 463, 465. Brown v. Maryland, (1827) 12 Wheat. (U.S.) 419,
6 L. Ed. 678; Dooley v. United States, (1901) 183 U. S. 151, 22 Sup. Ct.
62, 46 L. Ed. 128.
55(1918) 247 U. S. 321, 38 Sup. Ct. 499, 62 L. Ed. 1135; see also
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tinguishing between "a tax measured by gross receipts and one
measured by net income," leads one to believe that the Ficklen
Case would no longer be followed.
From these decisions it appears that a sales tax cannot be
applied by the state of destination to sales of goods which at the
time of the sale are outside the state, unless the goods pass through
the hands of a local merchant so as to make the sale to the
buyer in reality a local sale, separate and distinct from the trans-
actions between the out of state seller and the merchant. Neither
can a privilege or occupation tax measured by the gross sales be
placed on the business of selling or soliciting the sale of goods
outside the state at the time of the sale. But where the goods
sold have been brought within the state previous to the time of
sale, either a sales tax or an occupation tax measured by the gross
sales may be applied, except where the sale of a product of extra-
state origin is so closely connected with the interstate transporta-
tion as to constitute a part of the interstate commerce in the prod-
uct, as in the case of the sale of gas or electricity to distributing
companies. However, sales of such a product to consumers may
be taxed where the sales require acts within the state analogous
to the breaking of the original package in the case of imports.
And persons engaged in selling goods which at the time of sale
are within the state may be taxed on such sales even though they
also sell goods which at the time of sale are outside the state,
unless the sales are merely incidental to and a necessary part of
the business of selling the goods outside the state. But an attempt
to include the receipts from the sale of goods outside the state at
the time of sale in the measure of a tax on the privilege of selling
goods which at the time of sale are within the state would prob-
ably be held bad.
2. Taxes Imposed by the State of Origin.
The cases involving taxes imposed by the state of origin of
the goods sold have been divided into two groups: first, cases
dealing with taxes on the sale or occupation of selling goods,
which at the time of sale are within the state, to buyers outside
the state; second, cases involving taxes on acts or occupations car-
ried on withir the state precedent to the sale of the goods
to out of state buyers.
Peck & Co. v. Lowe, (1918) 247 U. S. 165, 38 Sup. Ct. 432, 62 L. Ed. 1049.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
A. TAXES ON THE SALE OR OCCUPATION OF SELLING GOODS,
WITHIN THE STATE AT THE TimE OF SALE, TO BUYERS OUTSIDE
THE STATE.-A tax on the sale or occupation of selling goods,
which at the time of the sale are in the state, is an unconstitutional
regulation of interstate commerce where the sales are made directly
to buyers outside the state. In Heyman v. Hays"° a privilege tax
was held bad as applied to the business of selling liquor by mail,
all the sales being made to buyers outside the state. It was claimed
that the receiving of the orders and the maintaining within the
taxing state of a stock of goods and a clerical force necessary to
pack and ship the liquor constituted a local business, separate and
distinct from the interstate commerce, for which a tax could be
imposed. To this the court answered:
"we are of the opinion that, giving the fullest effect to the
conditions stated, they were but the performance of acts accessory
to and inhering in the right to make the interstate commerce
shipments, and therefore to admit the power, because of their
existence to burden the tight to ship in interstate commerce
would necessarily be to recognize the authority to directly burden
such right. In the nature of things the protection against the
imposition of direct burdens upon the right to (1o interstate com-
merce, as often pointed out by this court, is not a mere abstractiom,
affording no real protection, but is practical and substantial, and
embraces those acts which are necessary to the complete enjoyment
of the right protected."57
If, however, the business consisted both in making sales to local
buyers and also to out of state buyers, the sales to the local
buyers could be taxed." But any privilege tax which atteml)ted
to measure the quantum of the tax by the total receipts, including
those from the sales to out of state buyers, would now undoubtedly
be held invalid."
Taxes on the sale or occupation of selling goods are consti-
tutional where both the goods sold and the buyer are within the
state at the time of the sale, even though the sale is made in the
process of or preliminary to the transportation of the goods in
interstate commerce. In Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel
Knox00 the seller of gasoline delivered it within the state of origin
5G(1915) 236 U. S. 178, 35 Sup. Ct. 403, 59 L. Ed. 527.
57(1915) 236 U. S. 178, 186, 35 Sup. Ct. 403, 59 L. Ed. 527.58Ratterman v. Western Union Tel. Co., (1888) 127 U. S. 411. 8 Sup.
Ct. 1127, 32 L. Ed. 229.59See Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, (1917) 245 U. S. 292. 38 Sup.
Ct. 126, 62 L. Ed. 295, and supra, (pp. 463, 465. 472).60(1930) 280 U. S. 390, 50 Sup. Ct. 169, 74 L. Ed. 504.
STATE SALES TAXES
to the purchaser, who transported it into another state for resale
there, the purchaser receiving a bill of lading calling for delivery
to him in the other state. This subterfuge by the seller did not
prevent the state of origin from taxing the sale, Mr. Justice
Holmes declaring that "the connection of the seller with the steps
taken by the buyer after the sale was too remote to save the seller
from the tax." And in Chassaniol v. Grcenzwood8 ' a municipal
license tax on cotton buyers was upheld even though all the cotton
purchased was later sold to buyers in other states. In both these
cases there was an established course of business which regularly
took the goods into other states. Earlier cases holding invalid
police regulations over sales made entirely within the state but
in the course of and preliminary to interstate commerce, were dis-
tinguished by the court. Those cases 62 provided for the licensing
and regulation of grain buyers, who, although buying grain within
the state, purchased the grain for shipment and sale to purchasers
in other states. The court in these decisions is apparently making
a distinction between state police power and state taxing power
in the state of origin similar to the distinction applied in the state
of destination. 63  Evidently the court will now allow state taxa-
tion of sales of goods made immediately precedent or antecedent to
interstate transportation, although still condemning applications
of the police power.
Sales of goods made to commission merchants within the state
of origin in response to orders from out of state buyers would
probably be exempt from taxation even though the title to the
goods technically passed to the merchant and then to the buyer.
This result would seem to follow by analogy from the result
reached in the state of destination( 4 and in the case of exports. 3
B. TAXES ON ACTS OR OCCUPATIONS CARRIED ON WVITHIN
THE STATE PRECEDENT TO THE SALE OF THE GOODS TO OUT OF
STATE BUYERS.-Taxes upon the acts or occupations of severing
(1(1934) 291 U. S. 584, 54 Sup. Ct. 541, 78 L. Ed. 1004.
r2Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, (1921) 257 U. S. 282,
42 Sup. Ct. 106, 66 L. Ed. 239; Lemke v. Farmers' Grain Co., (1922) 258
U. S. 50, 42 Sup. Ct. 244, 66 L. Ed. 458; Shafer v. Farmers' Grain Co.,(1925) 268 U. S. 189, 45 Sup. Ct. 481, 69 L. Ed. 909.63Powel, Contemporary Commerce Clause Controversies Over State
Taxation, (1928) 76 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 773, 958-59.
64Stockard v. Morgan, (1902) 185 U. S. 27, 22 Sup. Ct. 576, 46 L. Ed.
785; see also Waring v. Mobile, (1869) 8 Wall. (U. S.) 110, 19 L. Ed. 342.
65 Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, (1923) 262 U. S. 66, 43 Sup. Ct. 485,
67 L. Ed. 865.
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or extracting products of nature have been sustained by the court
where the measure of the tax was a percentage of the value of the
product determined at the time of severance or extraction. In
Lacoste v. Department of Conservation"6 the Louisiana severance
tax imposed on all skins and hides taken within the state irrespec-
tive of their destination was upheld. Since all the hides in question
were shipped out of the state, it was claimed that the tax was an
interference with interstate commerce. The court dismissed this
by saying:
"The state's power to tax property is not destroyed by the fact
that it is intended for and will move in interstate commerce. Such
skins and hides may be taxed while in the hands of dealers before
they move in interstate commerce." 67
An earlier case 3 had upheld a Pennsylvania tax on each ton
of anthracite coal, measured by a percentage of the value when
mined and prepared for market, in spite of the fact that Pennsyl-
vania had a virtual monopoly of such coal and that most of the
coal was shipped out of the state. This was followed by Oliver
Iron Mining Co. v. Lord"" which sustained a tax on the occupa-
tion of mining iron ore, the tax being measured by a percentage
of the value of the ore at the time of mining. As most of the ore
was shipped directly from the mines to points outside the state, it
was claimed the tax was an unconstitutional regulation of inter-
state commerce. To this the court answered:
"Plainly the facts do not support the contention. Mining is
not interstate commerce, but, like manufacturing, is a local busi-
ness, subject to local regulation and taxation ...
"The ore does not enter interstate commerce until after the
mining is done, and the tax is imposed only in respect of the min-
ing. No discrimination against interstate commerce is involved.
The tax may indirectly and incidentally affect such commerce, just
as any taxation of railroad and telegraph line does, but this is not
a forbidden burden or interference. 70
Severance or extraction taxes, it thus appears, are not in
themselves repugnant to the commerce clause; the difficulty arises
when an attempt is made to measure the quantum of the tax by
a percentage of the gross sales, including the receipts from the
sale of goods to buyers outside the state.
66(1924) 263 U. S. 545, 44 Sup. Ct. 186, 68 L. Ed. 437.
67(1924) 263 U. S. 545, 551, 44 Sup. Ct. 186, 68 L. Fd. 437.
"
8Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., (1922) 260 U. S. 245, 43 Sup. Ct. 83,
67 L. Ed. 237.
69(1923) 262 U. S. 172, 43 Sup. Ct. 526, 67 L. Ed. 929.
70(1923) 262 U. S. 172, 178-79, 43 Sup. Ct. 526, 67 L. Ed. 929.
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In Hope Natural Gas Co. v. HaIP' a privilege tax on pro-
ducers of natural gas was upheld although most of the gas was
transported direct from the wells to other states and there sold.
It was claimed that the act was unconstitutional because in deter-
mining the amount of the tax it took into consideration the gross
receipts received from the sale of the gas both within and without
the state. The state court had previously held that the receipts
from the sale of gas outside the state could be used "only for the
purpose of determining the value of such commodity within the
state and before it enters interstate commerce." An injunction
had there.fore been issued prohibiting the state tax commissioner
from treating the gross proceeds from the sale of gas outside the
state as the worth of the gas within the state, but allowing him to
base the tax on the value of the gas before it entered interstate
commerce. Mr. Justice McReynolds, in upholding the tax, de-
clared:
"we review the final decree and must accept the statute as
authoritatively construed and applied. The plain result of the
opinion and final decree is to require that the tax be computed
upon the value of the gas at the well, and not otherwise. If,
hereafter, the executive officers disregard the approved construc-
tion and fix values upon any improper basis appropriate relief
may be obtained through the courts.172
The case, although not expressly deciding the point, indicates
rather strongly that a severance or extraction tax could not be
measured by the gross receipts from the sale of the product where
part of the sales are made to persons outside the state.
Taxes on the act or occupation of processing or manufacturing
goods within the state have also been upheld although a part or
all of the goods were later transported and sold to buyers in other
states. In Utah Power and Light Co. v. Phost7" a license tax
on the generation of electricity, measured by the amount of elec-
tricity generated, was held constitutional where the most of the
electricity was transported into other states and there sold to con-
sumers. It was claimed that the generation and transmission were
substantially instantaneous so that the one could not be separated
from the other and thus a tax on the generation was in fact a tax
on the interstate transmission and sale. Mr. Justice Sutherland,
7(1927) 274 U. S. 284, 47 Sup. Ct. 639, 71 L. Ed. 1049.
72(1927) 274 U. S. 284, 288, 47 Sup. Ct. 639, 71 L. Ed. 1049.
73(1932) 286 U. S. 165, 52 Sup. Ct. 548, 76 L. Ed. 1038. See Howard,
Gas and Electricity in Interstate Commerce, (1934) 18 MNNEsorA LAw
REviEw 611, 696.
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however, found that the "process of generation" was "essentially
local" and therefore subject to state taxation. To him the gen-
erator and the transmission lines performed different functions,
comparable to the manufacture of goods and their subsequent
shipment and transportation in commerce. And in the more recent
case of Federal Compress & W. Co. v. McLean74 a license tax
on the business of storing and compressing cotton was upheld
"although in the ordinary course of business the cotton would
ultimately reach points outside the state." The cotton was col-
lected at the warehouse, compressed and held for shipment outside
the state. In speaking of taxes on acts precedent to interstate
commerce Mr. Justice Stone declared:
"A non-discriminatory tax upon the business of storing and
compressing the cotton, which is not itself the subject of a move-
ment in interstate commerce, is not forbidden. Most articles, be-
fore their shipment in interstate commerce, have had work done
upon them which adapts them to the needs of commerce and
prepares them for safe and convenient transportation, but that
fact has never been thought to immunize from local taxation either
the articles themselves or those who have manufactured or other-
wise prepared them for interstate transportation. . . . Here the
privilege taxed is exercised before interstate commerce begins,
hence the burden of the tax upon the commerce is too indirect and
remote to transgress constitutional limitations. 75
The court evidently finds no difficulty with processing or manu-
facturing taxes as such; here again the trouble arises when the
state of origin attempts to measure such a tax by a percentage of
the gross receipts including those from the sale of the goods to
out of state buyers.
The city of St. Louis, in accordance with power granted by a
state statute, levied a privilege tax on manufacturers measured by
a percentage of the gross sales of manufactured goods, irrespective
of whether the goods were sold within or without the state, or
whether the receipts came from intrastate or interstate commerce.
It was objected, in American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis," that the tax
was unconstitutional as applied to the receipts from sales of goods
within the state at the time of sale to buyers outside the state, and
the receipts from sales where both the goods sold and the buyers
were outside the state at the time of sale. Mr. justice Pitney in
upholding the tax declared:
,4(1934) 291 U. S. 17, 54 Sup. Ct. 267. 78 L. Ed. 622.
75(1934) 291 U. S. 17. 21-22, 54 Sup. Ct. 267, 78 L. E(d. 622.
76(1919) 250 U. S. 459. 39 Sup. (t. 522, 63 L. Ed. 1084.
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"The city might have measured such tax by a percentage upon
the value of all goods manufactured, whether they ever should
come to be sold or not, and have required payment as soon as, or
even before, the goods left the factory. In order to mitigate the
burden, . .. it has postponed ascertainment and payment of the
tax until the manufacturer can bring the goods into market ....
"In the outcome the tax is the same in amount as if it were
measured by the sale value of the goods, but imposed upon the
completion of their manufacture."7 7
Although the case in fact allowed the tax to apply to the gross
receipts from interstate commerce and commerce entirely outside
the state, it is apparent from the opinion that the court considered
the gross receipts merely as a measure of the value of the manu-
factured product at the time of manufacture. Thus viewed the
ordinance was a legitimate exercise of the taxing power. The
case, therefore, merely recognizes the power of a state to impose
a tax on the business of manufacturing and to measure the tax
by the value of the product at the time of manufacture. It seems
in accord with the later statements by Mr. Justice McReynolds in
the Gas Case7s and would probably furnish no support for the
application of a sales tax by the state of origin to sales of goods
to buyers in other states, nor for a privilege tax on the business of
processing or manufacturing goods where the tax is levied directly
on the gross receipts from the sale of the goods, a part of which
are derived from sales to buyers in other states.
The conclusion from these cases is that the state of origin may
not apply a sales tax or an occupation tax measured by a per-
centage of the gross sales to the receipts from the sale of goods,
which at the time of sale are within the state, to buyers outside
the state. But if the business consists in making sales both to
out of state buyers and also to buyers within the state, the latter
sales may be taxed. However, an attempt to measure an occu-
pation tax by the receipts from both sources would probably be
unconstitutional. The sale or occupation of selling goods to buyers
within the state may be taxed even though the sales are made in
the process of or preliminary to the interstate transportation of
the goods, but sales to commission merchants probably may not be
taxed where the goods are purchased in response to orders from
out of state customers and shipped directly to the out of state
buyers. The acts or occupations of severing, extracting, proces-
.7(1919) 250 U. S. 459, 463-64, 39 Sup. Ct. 522, 63 L. Ed. 1084.
78(1927) 274 U. S. 284, 47 Sup. Ct. 639, 71 L. Ed. 1049.
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sing, or manufacturing goods may be taxed by the state even
though the goods so treated are intended for and do later move
in interstate commerce. Such taxes may be measured by the
value of the goods at the time the acts are performed, but
an attempt to take the gross receipts from the sale of the goods
after interstate transportation and sale as the basis for the tax
would probably be unconstitutional as a tax on interstate com-
merce.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
A categorical conclusion as to the constitutionality of a state
sales tax is impossible; in some cases sales may be taxed, in others
they may not. The above review of the decisions of the Supreme
Court has indicated that a state's taxing power, as regards a sales
tax, is limited by those clauses of the federal constitution dealing
with imports and exports, and interstate commerce. The exemp-
tion in the case of imports extends only to the first sale, by the
importer, in the original package. In the case of exports all sales
made directly to foreign buyers, or to commission merchants in
the process of exportation, are exempt from taxation. When the
sale does not involve imports or exports, the important criterion
in determining taxability is the physical relation between the pur-
chaser and the goods sold. If at the time of sale the purchaser
and the goods sold are in different states, and the consummation
of the sale contemplates the transportation and delivery of the
goods to the purchaser, the sale is exempt from taxation. The
sale may also be exempt even though the purchaser and the goods
sold are in the same state if the sale is incidental to, or constitutes
a part of, the interstate commerce in the product. In these in-
stances neither the sale, the privilege of engaging in the business
of selling, nor the gross receipts from the sale may be taxed.
